

Message Text

SECRET

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ACTION SS-25

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FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 7156
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AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV NIACT IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS NIACT IMMEDIATE
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T BEIRUT 1467

EXDIS

EO 11652: GDS
TAGS: PEPR
SUBJ: LEBANESE POSITION ON SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION

REF: STATE 69804

1. SUMMARY. GOL AGREES ON THREE PART RESOLUTION AND WANTS TO ADD A FOURTH. IT IS NOT CONCERNED IF RESOLUTION IS DELAYED BECAUSE OF TIME REQUIRED FOR COORDINATION, BUT IS NOT PREPARED TO DELAY DEBATE JUST TO PLEASE ISRAELIS. LEBANESE WOULD PREFER NOT RPT NOT TO INTRODUCE RESOLUTION AND TUENI WILL BE CONSULTING USUN ON SUBJECT. END SUMMARY.

2. MET WITH FOREIGN MINISTER BOUTROS AT 1100 LOCAL MARCH 18 TO DISCUSS POSITION IN SECURITY COUNCIL. HE SAID HE TOTALLY AGREED WITH US THAT THERE SHOULD BE ONLY ONE RPT ONE RESOLUTION CALLING FOR ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL AND RESPECT FOR LEBANESE TERRITORIAL

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INTEGRITY AND FOR UN FORCE IN SOUTH, OTHERWISE WE WOULD NEVER GET THE LATTER. HE DOES NOT CARE WHAT PRESSURE LEBANESE MISSION AT UN IS UNDER. DECISION WILL BE MADE AT BEIRUT, NOT NEW YORK. HE HAD ALREADY RECEIVED TEXT IN REFTEL FROM LEBANESE MISSION AND AGREED WITH IT, BUT WANTS TO MAKE ADDITIONS AS FOLLOWS:

A. IN FIRST PARAGRAPH INSERT WORD SOVEREIGNTY AFTER INTEGRITY.

B. RESOLUTION SHOULD SPELL OUT TERMS OF REFERENCE OF FORCE. HE
PROPOSED FOLLOWING LANGUAGE:

1. THE PURPOSE OF THE UN FORCE IS TO ASSIST THE LEGITIMATE
LEBANESE AUTHORITIES TO RESTORE SECURITY AND AUTHORITY IN THE AREA
IN QUESTION.

2. THE AREA OF ITS COMPETENCE IS AS DEFINED ON THE ATTACHED MAP
(TO BE AGREED ON).

3. ITS MISSION IS TO PREVENT THE PRESENCE OR MOVEMENT OF ANY
FORCES WHICH ARE NOT LEGAL LEBANESE FORCES IN THE AREA AND TO
CONSTITUTE AN INSULATING LINE ALONG THE BORDER (UN ISOLANT SUR LA
FRONTIERE) BETWEEN LEBANON AND ISRAEL.

4. THE FORCE IS TO BE UNDER COMMAND OF THE UN, VESTED IN THE
SECRETARY GENERAL (AS IN CASE OF UNDOF) WHO WILL, AT THE REQUEST OF,
AND AFTER CONSULTATION WITH, THE LEBANESE GOVT DETERMINE THE
COMPOSITION AND SIZE OF THE FORCE AND ITS STATUS WITH RESPECT TO
RELATIONS WITH THE LEBANESE ARMY.

5. THE DURATION OF THE FORCE IS TO BE DECIDED BY THE GOVT OF
LEBANON, WHICH MAY AT ANY TIME ASK THE SECRETARY GENERAL TO
TERMINATE THE FORCE OR MODIFY ITS SIZE.

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3. WE ASSUME INSERTION OF THESE DETAILS WILL DELAY PROCESS. IN
THIS REGARD, I TOLD BOUTROS WE HAD PRESSING REQUEST FROM ISRAELIS
TO POSTPONE DEBATE UNTIL MONDAY. HE SAID IF DELAY WOULD
SERVE SOME PURPOSE HE WOULD NOT MIND. WHAT PURPOSE WOULD IT
SERV? I SAID ISRAELIS HAD NOT MADE THAT CLEAR, BUT HAD SAID
IT SHOULD BE DELAYED TO PERMIT FURTHER CONSULTATION WITH US.
BOUTROS SAID HE INTERPRETED THIS TO MEAN ISRAELIS WERE SIMPLY
TRYING TO IMPROVE ATMOSPHERE FOR BEGIN'S ARRIVAL IN WASHINGTON.
HE DID NOT THINK THERE WAS ANY REASON WHY LEBANON SHOULD FEEL
OBLIGED TO DO THAT. ON OTHER HAND, HE THOUGHT IT WAS IMPORTANT
THAT WE GET AN EFFECTIVE RESOLUTION PASSED AND ARRANGING THAT
MIGHT TAKE SOME TIME. IF THAT RESULTED IN DELAY, THAT WOULD NOT
BETTER HIM, AND HE REPEATED THAT THEY DID NOT CARE WHAT PRESSURE
TUENI WAS UNDER IN NEW YORK. HE WANTS EVERYTHING RUN FROM
BEIRUT AND WANTS TO DO IT CAREFULLY.

4. WITH REGARD TO WHO INTRODUCES RESOLUTION, BOUTROS SAID HE
WOULD PREFER THAT SOMEONE ELSE DO IT. IT WOULD BE A LITTLE
AWKWARD FOR LEBANON, GIVEN INTERNAL DIVISIONS WITHIN THE COUNTRY
AND THE PRESENCE OF THE PALESTINIANS. WHY COULDN'T SOMEONE ELSE
PRESENT IT? COULD NOT THE US DO IT SUPPORTED BY FRANCE AND ENGLAND?
I SAID WE WERE QUITE PREPARED TO PRESENT THE RESOLUTION OURSELVES

BUT IT WAS JUDGEMENT OF OUR MISSION AT UN AND DEPARTMENT THAT OUTCOME WOULD BE MUCH MORE PREDICTABLE IF LEBANESE DID IT. BOUTROS SAID PERHAPS THEY COULD GET ONE OF THE OTHER ARABS TO DO IT -- MAYBE KUWAIT. I SAID I DID NOT KNOW WHETHER RULES WOULD PERMIT KUWAIT TO INTRODUCE RESOLUTION. BOUTROS IS SEEKING ANSWER TO THIS QUESTION FROM HIS PEOPLE.

5. BOUTROS THEN ASKED WHO WE THOUGHT WOULD APOSE THE RESOLUTION IF WE INTRODUCED IT. SOVIET AMBASSADOR SOLDATOV HAD INDICATED YESTERDAY THAT THE SOVIETS WOULD NOT OPPOSE ANYTHING ACCEPTABLE TO LEBANON. SIMILARLY, HE THOUGHT SYRIA WOULD GO ALONG. WHO ELSE WAS THERE TO CAUSE TROUBLE? I SAID I DID NOT KNOW BUT WAS DEFERRING TO THE JUDGEMENT OF OUR PEOPLE IN NEW YORK WHO HAD MUCH BETTER FEEL FOR SITUATION THAN I DID. HE REFLECTED FOR A WHILE
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AND THEN SAID HE WOULD TAKE THE MATTER UP WITH THE PRESIDENT. HE LATER CALLED TO SAY HE WAS SENDING INSTRUCTIONS TO RUENI TO CONSULT WITH USUN AND SYRIANS ON HOW RESOLUTION COULD BEST BE INTRODUCED. HE WOULD STILL PREFER THAT LEBANON NOT DO IT.

6. BOUTROS SAID HE WAS GETTING TIRED OF HAVING TO SOLVE ONE INSOLUABLE PROBLEM AFTER ANOTHER. HE HAD HAD A TOUGH TIME WITH THE SYRIANS YESTERDAY. KHADDAM HAD ASKED WHY LEBANON HAD DELAYED PRESENTING COMPLAINT TO SECURITY COUNCIL AND BOUTROS HAD TOLD HIM THE NEXT TIME THE PALESTINIANS LAUNCHED A RAID FROM LEBANESE TERRITORY HE WAS NOT EVEN GOING TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL, OR IF HE DID IT WOULD BE TO LAUNCH A COMPLAINT AGAINST THE PALESTINIANS. KHADDAM HAD QUICKLY CHANGED HIS TONE AND TOLD BOUTROS HE MUST NOT DO THAT BECAUSE OF IMPACT IT WOULD HAVE ON ARAB SOLIDARITY. BOUTROS SAID HE HAD GONE TO SECURITY COUNCIL IN SPITE OF OBJECTIONS OF CHAMOUN AND GEMAYEL. PRIME MINISTER HOSS WAS TALKING ABOUT THE RISK HE RAN THAT HIS DAUGHTER MIGHT BE KIDNAPPED BY THE PALESTINIANS BECAUSE OF LEBANESE POLICY. WHAT RISK DID HOSS THINK BOUTROS RAN WITH CHRISTIANS ALREADY HAVING TRIED TO BLOW UP HIS HOUSE ONCE? HE HAD DECIDED THIS WAS OCCASION WHEN LEBANESE MUST SHOW A CERTAIN INDEPENDENCE FROM SYRIA AND THE OTHER ARABS. THEY WERE GOING TO DETERMINE THEIR POLICY ON THE BASIS OF WHAT LEBANON'S INTERESTS WERE. THEY WANTED A SOLID RESOLUTION THAT WOULD PROVIDE FOR AN EFFECTIVE UN FORCE. HE DID NOT CARE WHAT HAPPENED BETWEEN RHODESIA AND ZAMBIA. HE WANTED TO PROTECT LEBANON'S INTERESTS.

7. BOUTROS SAID HE DID NOT KNOW WHAT HE WOULD DO IF THE PALESTINIANS DID NOT ACCEPT THE RESOLUTION. THERE WERE TWO PROBABILITIES IN THAT CASE. ONE WOULD BE A CHRISTIAN DEMAND FOR PARTITION AND THE OTHER THAT LEBANESE MOSLEMS WOULD JOIN WITH THE CHRISTIANS IN FIGHTING THE PALESTINIANS. HE HAD MADE THIS CLEAR TO KHADDAM.

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8. BOUTROS LEFT FOREIGN MINISTRY IMMEDIATELY AFTER I DID IN ORDER TO MEET SARKIS UP AT BAABDA. HE SUBSEQUENTLY CALLED TO ASK FOR INSERTION OF WORD "SOVEREIGNTY" MENTIONED ABOVE, AND TO GO OVER LANGUAGE OF PROPOSED TERMS OF REFERENCE. HE INDICATED THAT PRESIDENT IS ON BOARD.

9. COMMENT: BOUTROS HAS DECIDED IT IS TIME TO STAND UP AND BE COUNTED. THIS IS ACT OF PHYSICAL COURAGE ON HIS PART. HE WANTS AN EFFECTIVE RESOLUTION, AND HE IS PREPARED TO WRANGLE THROUGHOUT THE WEEKEND IF THAT IS WHAT IS REQUIRED TO GET IT. I ASSUME THE ADDITIONAL LANGUAGE HE POSES WILL CAUSE US PROBLEMS, BUT ALSO HAVE FAITH IN USUN'S ABILITY TO FIND A WAY.

10. USUN'S 968 RECEIVED AFTER ABOVE DRAFTED. GOT BOUTROS ON THE LINE AND TOLD HIM ABOUT ALTERNATIVE PROCEDURE DESCRIBED IN PARA 9 OF THAT MESSAGE. HE SAID NOTHING DOING. HE WANTS ONE RESOLUTION, NOT TWO, AND HE SAYS KHADDAM ASSURES HIM SYRIA WILL NOT OPPOSE WHAT LEBANON DECIDES IN THIS CASE. (NOTE: HE SEEMED MORE POSITIVE ABOUT THIS THAN HE HAD EARLIER.) TUENI HAS BEEN SO INSTRUCTED.

PARKER

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NNN

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